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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to the Order of Transfer from the
Utah Supreme Court dated June 4,2008 issued according to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See also, § 78A-4-103(2)0). Utah Code Ann. (2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

WAS THE BRIEF OF JONATHAN HALL SO DEFICIENT IN COMPLYING

WITH THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE THAT THE APPEAL
SHOULD BE DENIED OR DISMISSED?
The standard of review for the sufficiency of a brief is to compare the brief w ith Rule
24 and determine whether it complies therewith. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah
App. 1991).
2.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT WHERE JONATHAN HALL, WHO WAS INVOLVED IN A SEPARATE
INCIDENT WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED HIS ALLEGED INJURIES, FAILED TO
DESIGNATE AN EXPERT ON CAUSATION?
The Trial Court's determination that Jonathan Hall failed to establish a prima facie
case on the element of causation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Fox v.
Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, ^[14, 176 P.3d 446.

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, controls the resolution of whether
Plaintiffs brief is procedurally sufficient for appellate review. The text of the rule is in
Addendum "A". This Court's holdings in Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App
406, 176 P.3d 446 and Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015 control
resolution of whether the Trial Court correctly dismissed Jonathan Hall's claims against
Jason Steimle. The text of the foregoing cases is in Addendum WB".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury case wherein Jonathan Hall seeks compensation for alleged

injuries and damages relating to a December 11, 2000 motor vehicle accident.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Complaint was filed on December 9, 2004 in the Fourth District Court. (R. at 3-

5). Defendant, Jason Steimle, answered on March 2, 2006. (R. at 30-33).
After discovery was completed, and all deadlines for designating experts had passed,
Jason Steimle filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment,
with which this brief is concerned, was filed on December 7, 2007. (R. at 121-130). The
Trial Court granted that motion at oral argument on March 25, 2008 with the formal Order
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entered on April 23, 2008. (R. at 171, 176-78). This appeal was taken on May 27, 2008. (R.
at 180).
C

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court granted Jason Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment upon finding

that Jonathan Hall was required to designate a causation expert regarding whether the motor
vehicle accident at issue caused the injuries for which he seeks compensation. The Trial
Court held that because Jonathan Hall failed to designate a causation expert, he could not
establish that the December 2000 motor vehicle accident caused the injuries at issue in his
complaint. (R. at 176-78).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of December 11, 2000, Jonathan Hall was riding as a
passenger in Jason Steimle's vehicle as they traveled from Rexburg, Idaho to Salt Lake City,
Utah. Prior to reaching Salt Lake City, the weather had been clear. (R. at 4-5, 116, 135).
As the vehicle approached the 33rd South off-ramp on I-15, Mr. Steimle saw that a car
was off the road. In response, Mr. Steimle slowed his vehicle from freeway speeds to about
40 to 45 miles per hour. (R. at 4-5, 118).
Mr. Steimle's vehicle then began to slide on black ice. After sliding 20 to 30 yards,
the vehicle collided with the retaining wall of the off-ramp. (R. at 117-18). Due to the
weather conditions, Jonathan Hall was surprised there was black ice on the road. (R. at 115).
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At the point of impact, Mr. Hall's head moved to the side. His head did not hit a
window or any other objects inside the vehicle. (R. at 113-14). Mr. Hall did not go to the
hospital after the accident. (R. at 134).
Although there is some confusion in the record, it appears Mr. Hall presented to the
Anderson Chiropractic Center with complaints of neck pain on December 11, 2000. (R. at
132).1
Mr. Hall had already consulted with Dr. Anderson regarding his neck pain prior to the
motor vehicle accident at issue (the "MVA"). On October 4, 2000, just two months prior to
the MVA, Mr. Hall received a chiropractic assessment from Anderson Chiropractic Center,
at which time he complained of neck and back pain, rating his neck pain at a 4 on a scale
from 1 to 10. At that time, Mr. Hall was assessed as having chronic cervical dorsal
myofascial pain syndrome with C7/T1 subluxation, as well as thoracic and ankle dysfunction.
(R. at 107).
Regarding pre-existing neck and back injuries, Mr. Hall stated the following in
response to discovery requests: "Plaintiff had a whiplash injury in the summer of 1998/1999
when he dove into a shallow lake. He was treated by Dr. Frank Smith [in Wichita, Kansas].

1

During his deposition, Mr. Hall could not recall whether he experienced neck pain
the morning after the incident or a couple of days later. (R. at 132-33). Nevertheless, the
precise timing of Mr. HalPs alleged neck pain is not material to this appeal.
4

He sustained a back injury and whiplash injury from hitting his chin on the lake bed." (R.
at 104-05).
On December 9, 2004, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, asserting negligence claims
against Mr. Steimle in connection with the December 2000 MVA. (R. at 4-5).
In his Complaint, Mr. Hall alleges he "suffered permanent injuries to his neck and
back," caused by Mr. Steimle's alleged negligence. (R. at 4).
Under the Trial Court's Amended Stipulated Scheduling Order, Plaintiffs expert
reports were due on June 1, 2007. Plaintiff neither designated nor otherwise provided an
expert report to the Trial Court or Mr. Hall's counsel. (R. at 99-100, 177).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court's ruling on Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
upheld based on the following:
First, Mr. Hall's brief fails to provide any citation to the Record and therefore fails to
comply with Rules 24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Accordingly, Mr. Hall's appeal should be dismissed.
Second, the Trial Court correctly held that Mr. Hall was required to designate an
expert in order to meet his prima facie burden on the element of causation. Prior to the
December 2000 MVA, Mr. Hall suffered a whiplash injury when he dove into a shallow lake.
Because Mr. Hall was still treating for neck pain just prior to the MVA, he cannot establish
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his neck problems were caused by the MVA absent expert testimony. Because Mr. Hall
never retained an expert to render an opinion on causation, the Trial Court correctly
dismissed his claims.
ARGUMENT
L THE FORM OF THE JONATHAN HALL BRIEF REQUIRES DISMISSAL
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure makes clear that an appellant's brief
"shall be supported by citations to the record...." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7).
The mandatory language of Rule 24 has long been enforced by this Court. For
example, in State v. Reiner s, 803 P.2d 1300 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated that a brief
must have some support for every contention made in the brief. A brief must also develop
appellate arguments and explicitly tie those arguments to the Record. West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). Furthermore, the failure to make
a concise statement of facts and citation to the pages in the Record where those facts are
supported will result in this Court assuming the correctness of the judgment below. Steele
v Board of Review of Industrial Comm }n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993).
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B.

THE JONATHAN HALL BRIEF FAILS TO PROPERLY CITE TO
THE RECORD

Mr. Hall's brief fails to follow the requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. Hall does not provide this Court with a single citation to
the official Record. Instead, Mr. Hall adopts his own procedure of placing documents he
believes to be relevant in the addendum to the brief and then simply citing to that addendum.
A reading of Rule 24 and the case law cited above shows that this Court has a reasonable
standard of anticipating briefing will be completed in compliance with Rule 24. Rule 24 is
structured to allow this Court to review the case without shifting the work to the Court of
Appeals to compensate for deficiencies in the legal advocacy of the brief. Mr. Halfs brief
fails to meet that standard. As explained above, failure to cite to the official record has been
found sufficient alone to dismiss or affirm an appeal.
Rather than providing this Court with Record evidence in order to support his
arguments, Mr. Hall improperly expects this Court to verify his arguments by searching the
Record on its own. Accordingly, Mr. Halfs appeal should be dismissed for failure to follow
the fundamental rules of presenting an argument to this Court.
II. BECAUSE MR. HALL FAILED TO DESIGNATE A CAUSATION EXPERT,
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HIS CLAIMS
Because Mr. Hall failed to present expert testimony to establish prima facie evidence
of causation, the Trial Court correctly granted Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment.
7

According to the Utah Supreme Court, u[c]ausation is one of the critical elements of any
negligence action." Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 1999). In the present
action, Mr. Hall is unable to prove that the December 2000 MVA caused injuries to his neck
and back. Accordingly, the Trial Court properly dismissed his claims.
A. Expert Testimony Is Necessary to Establish a Causal LinkBetween the Motor
Vehicle Accident and Plaintiffs Alleged Injuries
Mr. Hall seeks damages for "'permanent injuries to his neck and back," as well as
medical expenses allegedly related to the MVA. However, any causal link between the
December 2000 accident and Mr. Hall's alleged injuries is beyond an ordinary lay person's
knowledge, which required Mr. Hall to present expert causation testimony. The Utah Court
of Appeals addressed this precise issue in Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 2000 UT App 285,
12P.3d 1015.
In Beard, the plaintiff was injured in a K-Mart store when an employee struck her in
the head with his elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. Id. at <p. Thereafter, the
plaintiff sought damages relating to surgeries, which she alleged were necessitated by the
accident. Id. Although the plaintiff retained an expert, he was unable to testify to a degree
of medical probability that the accident at K-Mart caused the need for the surgeries. Id. at
^13. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was therefore unable to prove the
accident caused the need for surgery:
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In Utah, in all but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay
witnesses regarding the need for specific medical treatment is
inadequate to submit the issue to the jury. Where the injury
involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an ordinary
lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding, there must be expert testimony that the negligent act
probably caused the injury.
The diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are medical
questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and
not by lay persons. Thus, we conclude expert testimony on this
medical causation issue was required before the issue of
damages arising from these surgeries was submitted to the jury.
Id. at 1} 16. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals recently revisited this issue in the case of Fox v. Brigham Young
University, 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446. In Fox, the plaintiffs brought suit against BYU
for negligence and loss of consortium, alleging BYU had negligently maintained stairs on
its property, which caused the plaintiff to slip, fall, and break her leg. Id. at ^|8. Prior to the
accident, the plaintiff had been diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her right knee. Id. Before
trial, the plaintiffs conceded they would not be presenting expert testimony, asserting that lay
testimony was sufficient because the injury and damages experienced were within the realm
of common experience. Id. at 1|9. Based on the plaintiffs' pre-existing condition, BYU
brought a motion in limine, arguing expert testimony was required to establish a causal link
between the incident at BYU and the plaintiffs injuries.

Id. at ^[8. The trial court,

recognizing the dispositive nature of BYU's motion in limine, converted the motion to one
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for dismissal. Id. at ^jlO. The trial court held that the plaintiffs '"could not sustain their
burden of proof as to causation and damages because [plaintiffs'] lay witness testimony was
insufficient to establish their prima facie case." Id at 1J11. The trial court noted that "it had
been presented with two plausible theories of causation - failure of an osteoarthritic knee or
defective stairs - and, absent expert testimony, the court would have to use speculation to
choose between the two theories." Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that the "causal connection
between the alleged negligent act and the injury is never presumed and ... this is a matter the
plaintiff is always required to prove affirmatively." Id. at ^|21 (quoting Jackson v. Colston,
209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1949)).
Based on the foregoing law in Utah, the Fox court held: "[the plaintiff s] lay testimony
would not have been sufficient to determine whether the need for her medical treatment, the
surgery and attachment of the fixator, was caused by B YU's allegedly defective stairs or the
failure of her own arthritic knee." Id. at ^|23. Because the plaintiffs lay testimony was
insufficient, ''the trial court correctly ruled that [the plaintiff] had failed to prove the element
of causation." Id.
Like the plaintiffs in Beard and Fox, Mr. Hall was required to retain an expert to
testify that the December 2000 MVA caused permanent injuries to his neck and back.
Furthermore, expert testimony was required to establish a causal link between the MVA and
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Mr. Hall's medical expenses. It is undisputed that prior to the accident at issue, Mr. Hall
suffered a whiplash injury when he dove into a shallow lake. After that incident, Mr. Hall
sought medical treatment from Dr. Smith in Wichita, Kansas for neck and back pain. As of
October 2000, just two months prior to the MVA, Mr. Hall presented to Dr. Anderson with
continued complaints of neck and back pain, rating his neck pain at a 4 on a scale from 1 to
10. At that time, Mr. Hall was assessed as having chronic cervical dorsal myofascial pain
syndrome with C7/T1 subluxation, as well as thoracic dysfunction.
Based on the complexity of Mr. Hall's alleged neck and back injuries, an ordinary lay
person would be forced to speculate as to whether the December 2000 MVA caused any
injuries. Moreover, any such lay person would have to speculate as to the necessity of
Plaintiffs medical expenses. Under Mr. Hall's theory of the case, the finder of fact would
have to simply guess what caused Mr. Hall's injuries: (1) Mr. Hall's lake-diving accident;
or, (2) the December 2000 accident. Accordingly, Mr. Hall is unable to prove the element
of causation. As was the case in Beard and Fox, Mr. Hall was required to provide expert
testimony on the issue of causation. Because Mr. Hall failed to designate an expert on
causation, the Trial Court correctly dismissed his claims.
B. Mr. Hall Misconstrues Utah Case Law Regarding the Need for Expert
Testimony on Causation
Mr. Hall argues that, under Utah law, "cases involving injuries to the neck, back and
shoulder resulting from car accidents involve medical damages within the common
11

experience of a layperson." (Hall Brief, p. 11). In order to support this assertion, Mr. Hall
cites two cases from other jurisdictions, Jordan v. Srnoot, 380 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 1989)
and Waltonv. Gallbraith, 166 N.W.2d 605,606 (Mich. App. 1969).2 Both cases are factually
distinguishable from the present case.
In Jordan, the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff had never been under
medical care for similar injuries prior to the auto accident in question. 380 S.E.2d at 714.
Similarly, in Walton, the Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized that the plaintiff had
experienced "no previous neck or back pains" and that the pain began wCon the day after the
accident." 166 N.W.2d at 606. Because neither of the plaintiffs sought medical treatment
for similar injuries prior to the motor vehicle accidents in question, the Walton and Jordan
courts correctly found that no expert testimony was required on causation.
To the contrary, in this case Mr. Hall suffered neck and back injury prior to the
December 2000 accident. Indeed, Plaintiff was still actively treating for neck pain in October
2000, just two months prior to the accident. Accordingly, the Walton and Jordan cases are
distinguishable from, and therefore inapplicable to, the present action.

2

These same cases were addressed in Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 2000 UT App
285, 12 P.3d 1015. The Beard court ultimately dismissed their applicability, since "they
involve[d] medical damages within the common experience of a layperson." Id. at ^]13.
12

C.

Mr. Hall Cannot Rely on Treating Physicians to Provide Causation
Testimony

In his opening brief, Mr. Hall argues he has designated Dr. Anderson, one of his
treating physicians, as a fact witness. (Hall Brief, p. 12). Mr. Hall argues that *wDr.
Anderson's testimony concerning observable changes to Mr. Hall's condition versus his
condition prior to the accident on December 11, 2000 is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of negligence." (Id.) Contrary to Mr. Hall's argument, treating physicians offering
expert opinions must be designated in accordance with Ut. R. Civ. P. 26 under Utah law.
In Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UTApp. 303,141 P.3d 629, the plaintiff brought medical
malpractice claims against her plastic surgeon based on his alleged failure to remove gauze
packing from a wound site. Id. at Tflf3-4. During the discovery phase, the plaintiff designated
several treating physicians as individuals likely to have discoverable information. Id. at ^5.
However, the plaintiff did not designate any expert witnesses by the deadline imposed under
the applicable scheduling order. Id. at ^[6. The defendant thereafter filed a Motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had not designated any expert to opine as to the
appropriate standard of care and breach. Id. In response, the plaintiff offered the affidavit
of one of her treating physicians, opining as to the standard of care. Id. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff
offered no expert testimony. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that "treating physicians are
always exempt from the [expert disclosure] requirements of rule 26(a)(3)." Id. at Ijl 1.
13

This Court rejected that argument, holding:
To the extent a treating physician simply provides a factual
description of his or her personal observations during treatment,
the testimony is not opinion evidence and no identification of
the treating physician as an expert is required. If, however, the
treating physician also offers an opinion as to the standard of
care or whether that standard has been breached, the testimony
is no longer simply factual.
Id. at ^[13 (case citations omitted). In reaching its holding, the Court of Appeals also found
support from other jurisdictions:
If [treating physicians] only testify as to what they observed and
did within the physician-patient relationship, then they would be
fact witnesses; if, in addition to testifying about the facts, the
treating physicians offered an opinion, then they would be
expert witnesses.
Id. at H14 (quoting Smith v. Paiz, 84 P.3d 1272, 1275-76 (Wyo. 2004)). See also Thomas v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Mass. 1996) (case cited by Utah Court of Appeals,
requiring disclosure and an expert report where treating physician offered opinion on
causation: "a treating physician who has formulated opinions going beyond what was
necessary to provide appropriate care for the injured party steps into the shoes of a retained
expert for purposes of rule 26(a)(2)").
In the present action, it is undisputed Mr. Hall neither designated an expert nor
submitted any expert reports. Therefore, under the plain language of Youngblood, Mr. Hall's
treating physicians may not offer any opinions as to the cause of his injuries. Because Mr.
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Hall is unable to provide any evidence on causation, the Trial Court properly granted Mr.
Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment.
III. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mr. Hall argues two disputed facts should have precluded the Trial Court from
granting Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment: (1) when Mr. Hall began
experiencing pain after the December 2000 accident; and (2) the location, type, and severity
ofthe pain experienced by Mr. Hall following the accident. (Hall Brief, p. 12). Both issues
are immaterial to Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mr. Hall argues that Mr. Steimle's causation arguments are "based upon the fact that
there was a gap of a couple days between the accident and when Mr. Hall began seeking
treatment." (Hall Brief, p. 13). As set forth above, Mr. Steimle's causation argument has
nothing to do with Mr. Hall's date of treatment. Indeed, fact seven of Mr. Steimle's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment stated that Mr. Hall obtained
treatment on December 11, 2000, the same day as the accident. The confusion regarding Mr.
Hall's treatment comes from his own deposition testimony, wherein he stated he may not
have begun experiencing pain for a couple of days after the accident. Either way, Mr. HalPs
first date of treatment is irrelevant to Mr. Steimle's arguments on appeal, as well as his
Motion for Summary Judgment before the Trial Court. Rather than basing his causation
arguments on Mr. Hall's first date of treatment, Mr. Steimle bases his argument on Mr. HalFs
15

pre-existing injuries and treatment, coupled with his failure to obtain an expert on causation.
Thus, the date Mr. Hall first began treatment after the December 2000 accident is irrelevant
to his inability to establish causation.
As to the second "disputed" fact, Mr. Hall's testimony regarding the pain he
experienced after the December 2000 accident is also immaterial. Mr. Hall is not a medical
expert. He is unable to offer testimony regarding whether the December 2000 accident, or
his early lake-diving incident, caused his alleged injuries. Only a medical expert is able to
offer such testimony. Even with Mr. Hall's self-serving testimony, a fact finder would still
be forced to speculate as to whether the December 2000 accident or Mr. Hall's lake-diving
incident caused his injuries. Because Mr. Hall failed to designate an expert to provide
opinions regarding causation, he is unable to establish a causal link between the December
2000 MVA and his alleged injuries.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's ruling on Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
affirmed.
DATED this <A day of February, 2009.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P C .

NAN T. BASSETT
GARY T. WIGHT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
^li Title V. General Provisions
- • RULE 24. BRIEFS

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:

(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought
to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list
should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.

(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.

(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.

(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review
with supporting authority; and

(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or

(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.

(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.

(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
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(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged

(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award

(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought

(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum
is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table ot contents The addendum shall contain a copy of

(a)(l l)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief,

(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, in all cases any court
opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service, and

(a)(l 1)(C) those parts ot the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal,
such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction

(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
rule, except that the appellee need not include

(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant, or

(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may
refer to the addendum of the appellant

(c) Repl> brief. The appellant may file a brief in leply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has crossappealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the
cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing bnet The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No
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further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court

(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a
minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive
terms such as "the employee,1' "the injured person,' "the taxpayer,11 etc

(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(0 oi 1 !(g) References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify
the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and
each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified,
offered, and received or rejected

(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply
bnets shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any
addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this
rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs

(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice ot appeal
shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the couit otherwise orders Each party shall
be entitled to file two briefs No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's bnets shall in combination exceed
75 pages

(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal

(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Briet of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond
to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal

(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-A.ppellee,
which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant

(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall repl> to the Brief of CrossAppellee

(h) Permission for over length brief. W/hile such motions are disfavored, the court tor good cause shown mav
upon motion permit a party to file a briet that exceeds the limitations ot this rule The motion shall state with
specificity the issues to be bneted, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause tor granting the
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motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional
pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in
camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional
pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.

(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single
brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.

(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall
be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but
the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350
words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.

(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.

CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1,
2003; November 1, 2004; April I, 2006; November I, 2006; April 1, 2008.]
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currcntness
State Court Rules
*g| Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rcfs & Annos)
*j§l Part V. Depositions and Discovery
-• RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY

(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.

(a)( I) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or
directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the
information;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, data compilations,
electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment;
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying
on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1)
shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated
by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures
within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less;
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative
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agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel.
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present
evidence under Rules 7 02, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Lvidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to
a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared
and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of
any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or,
if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another
party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises;
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition
and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the
need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4)
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the
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court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (1) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition
designated by another party under subparagraph (B) and (n) any objection, together with the grounds therefor,
that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C) Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the \ h&h Rules or Fvidence, shall be deemed waived
unless excused by the court for good cause shown
(a)(5) Form oj disclosures Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following
methods depositions upon oral examination or written questions, written interrogatories, production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes, physical
and mental examinations, and requests for admission
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,
the scope of discovery is as follows
(b)(1) In general Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost The party shall expressly make any claim that
the source is not reasonably accessible, describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of
the information not provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that
the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost If that showing is made, the court
may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of
subsection (b)(3) The court may specify conditions for the discovery
(b)(3) Limitations The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall
be limited by the court if it determines that
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the lnrormation sought, or
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance ot the issues at stake in the litigation The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c)
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(b)(4) Trial preparation Materials Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person If the request is refused, the
person may move for a court order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in
relation to the motion For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical,
or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the
person making it and contemporaneously recorded
(b)(5) Trial preparation

Experts

(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented
at trial If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after
the report is provided
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be
called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
means
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time
spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, and
(b)(5)(C)(n) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) ot this rule the court may require,
and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert
(b)(6) Claims oj Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules
by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the
claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26

Page 5

assess the applicability of the privilege or protection
(b)(6)(B) Information produced If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or
of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis tor it After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim
is resolved A receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination
of the claim If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps
to retrieve it The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied
by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in
an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had,
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time
or place,
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery,
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters,
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court,
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court,
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way,
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as
are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery The pro\isions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except tor cases exempt under bubdiv tsion (a)(2), except as authorized
under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required b\ subdivision (f) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discoverv shall be completed within 240 days atter the
first answer is filed Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and vutnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise methods of discovery may be used in anv sequence and the tact that a party
is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise shall not operate to delay any other party's discov-
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(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a
request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party
learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or
in writing With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B)
the duty extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of
the expert
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production,
or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
discovery process or in writing
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise stipulated or directed
by order
(0(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person or by telephone
to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement ot the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule
the meeting The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree upon
the discovery plan
(0(2) The plan shall include
(0(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a),
including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made,
(0(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to particular issues,
(0(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced,
(0(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, including—it the
parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their
agreement in an order,
(0(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these mles and what other
limitations should be imposed,
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(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a non-party
and the identity of the non-party, and
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no more than
60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan The proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(8), except
that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court
or may be deferred until the close of discovery If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan
or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any
topic on which the parties are unable to agree Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 16(b)
(f)(5) A party joined atter the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is
not represented, whose address shall be stated The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
that the person has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, (2) not interposed
tor any improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation If a
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated
to take any action with respect to it until it is signed
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another state
may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions
and limitations as it such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which
the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising
during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court m the count) where the deposition is being taken
(i) Filing.
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(i)(l) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with the
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery
have been served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall
not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service
stating that the response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule
30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court.
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a
copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.
CREDIT(S)
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November 1, 2007; Comment amended effective November 1, 2008.]
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*ii Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rcfs & Annos)
*\g Title VI. Certification and Transfer Between Courts
- • RULE 42. TRANSFER OF CASE FROM SUPREME COURT TO COURT OF APPEALS

(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer. At any time before a case is set for oral argument before the
Supreme Court, the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any case except those cases within the Supreme
Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order of transfer shall be issued without opinion, written or oral, as to the
merits of the appeal or the reasons for the transfer.

(b) Notice of Order of Transfer. Upon entry of the order of transfer the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall give
notice of entry of the order of transfer by mail to each party to the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial court.
Upon entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transfer the original of the order and
the case, including the record and file of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Supreme Court, and
a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and including the order of transfer, to the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals.

(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of the original order of transfer from the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon the Court of Appeals
docket. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall immediately give notice to each party to the proceeding and to
the clerk of the trial court that the appeal has been docketed and that all further filings will be made with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. The notice shall state the docket number assigned to the case in the Court of Appeals.

(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record. If the record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall notify the clerk of the
trial court that upon completion of the conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has already been transmitted to and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the entry of the order of transfer, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within five
days of the date of the entry of the order of transfer.

(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of Appeals. Upon receipt by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of
the order of transfer and the entry thereof upon the docket of the Court of Appeals, the case shall proceed before
the Court of Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules.

(f) Finality of Order of Transfer. An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, is fi-
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nal and shall be subject to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court and only on jurisdictional grounds.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Former Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as Rules 42 and 43 respectively and included in a new title governing the certification and transfer of cases between courts. The amendments make uniform the practices followed by the two appellate courts in transferring cases.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Courts € ^ > 483 to 438.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k483 to 106k488.
C.J.S. Courts $§ 193 to 202.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Exhaustion of state remedies 2
Law of case I
1. Law of case
State Supreme Court's prior denial of motion to supplement record to include depositions which had not been
published in trial court record constituted the law of the case and would not be reconsidered by Court of Appeals
after case was transferred to it by Supreme Court. Conder \. A.L. Williams & Associate*, Inc.. 1987, "39 P.2d
634. Courts € ^ > 99(6)
2. Exhaustion of state remedies
Petitioner's original appeal to Utah Supreme Court, which was transferred to Utah Court of Appeals, did not
constitute exhaustion of state remedies, for purposes of federal habeas corpus; transfer process was an overflow
mechanism and not a review on the merits. Utah Rules App.Proc, Rule 42. Duhn \ Cook. 1992, 95" F.2d 758.
Habeas Corpus <£^z> 363
Rules App. Proa, Rule 42, UT R RAP Rule 42
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Joseph R. FOX and Linda A. Fox, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah nonprofit corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20061132-CA.
Dec. 28, 2007.
Background: Slip and fall victim sued university
alleging negligence that caused her to fall down
steps on campus. University moved to dismiss on
grounds that expert testimony was required by
plaintiff to prove causation and plaintiff was relying solely on her own testimony. Plaintiff moved to
limit admissibility of university emergency medical
technician's report. The Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Fred D. Howard, J., granted the
motion to dismiss and denied motion in limine.
Plaintiff appealed.
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Statements made by plaintiff regarding her medical
condition and the nature of her fall down some
steps on campus to university emergency medical
technicians (EMTs) were admissible in negligence
action against university, even though there was
statutory prohibition on admission of such statements taken by adversary unless a copy was left
with the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not disavow
the statement; rule of evidence permitted admission
of statements made for medical diagnosis to adversary and limited application of the statute.
West's U.C.A. § 78-27-33; Rules of Evid.. Rule
803(4).
[21 Negligence 272 ©=^1550
272 Negligence
272XVIH Actions
272XVIII(C) Evidence
272XVTTI(C)I Burden of Proof
272k 1550 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Negligence 272 €^>1568

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held
that:
(1) statements made to university emergency medical technicians regarding plaintiffs fall were admissible, and
(2) plaintiff was required to submit expert medical
testimony to made prima facie case for causation.
Affirmed.'
West Headnotes

\\\ Evidence \51 € ^ > m
I 5 7 Evidence
I 5~T\ Admissibility in General
!5~TV(B) Res Gestae; Excited Utterances
I5"k I24 Acts and Statements of Person
Sick or Injured
15 "7k 1 2N k. Statements to Physicians.
Yfo-it Cited l ascs

272 Negligence
272XVHI Actions
272XVHKC) Evidence
272XVll«C)l Burden of Proof
272k 1568 k. Proximate Cause. Most
Cited Cases
Plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of negligence, including proximate and
actual causation of the injury.
| 3 | Negligence 272 €^>1568
272 Negligence
272XVUI Actions
272XV11KC) Evidence
272XVUi(C)l Burden of Proof
272U568 k. Proximate Cause. Most
Cited C:^e%
Negligence 272 €^>1599
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272 Negligence
272XV1I1 Actions
272XV11KC) Evidence
272XYTII(C)2 Presumptions and Inferences
272k 1599 k. Proximate Cause. Most
Cited Cases
The causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the injury is never presumed and is a
matter the plaintiff is always required to prove affirmatively.
[4] Negligence 272 €^>1713
272 Negligence
272XV1II Actions
272XV!lf(T)) Questions for Jury and Directed Verdicts
272k 1712 Proximate Cause
272kl7i3 k. In General. Most Cited
Ca>es
Although the question of proximate causation is
generally reserved for the jury, the trial court may
rule as a matter of law on this issue if there is no
evidence to establish a causal connection between
the alleged negligent act and the injury, thus leaving causation to jury speculation.
j5| Negligence 272 €^>1675
272 Negligence
272XVII1 Actions
2~2XYIII<C) Evidence
272XVUUC)5 Weight and Sufficiency
272k 1674 Proximate Cause
272k i 6 7 5 k. In General; Degrees of
Proof. Most Cited Cases
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors
which are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding
as to whether the defendant's negligent act caused
the injury, there must be expert testimony that the
negligent act probably caused the injury; the testimony of lay witnesses in such cases regarding the
need for specific medical treatment is inadequate to
submit the issue to the jury, and it is only in the
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most obvious cases that a plaintiff may be excepted
from the requirement of using expert testimony to
prove causation.
[6| Colleges and Universities 81 £~^>5
8i Colleges and Universities
81k5 k. Powers, Franchises, and Liabilities in
General. Most Cited Cases
Plaintiffs fall on university steps was caused by
medical factors sufficiently complicated to be beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of
a layperson, and thus, expert medical testimony was
required to establish prima facie case for causation
of her broken leg, where plaintiff initially attributed
the fall to her knee "going out" and she admitted
that she had preexisting osteoarthritis in her knee.
West Codenotes
Limited on Preemption GroundsWest's L'.C.A. §
78-27-33
*447 Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, Spanish
Fork, Appellants Pro Se.
Thomas W. Sciler, Provo, for Appellee.
Before BENCH, P.J., McllUGH and TIIORNE, H.

OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
f I Plaintiffs Joseph and Linda Fox (the Foxes) appeal the trial court's dismissal of their claims
against Defendant Brigham Young University
(BYU) for their failure to present expert testimony
to prove the cause of Mrs. Fox's injury. The Foxes
also appeal the trial court's order denying their objections to the admission of an affidavit and an accident report prepared by BYU volunteer emergency medical technicians (EMTs) on the grounds
that the admission of such evidence violates I'tah
Code section 78-27-33. SeeLhih Code Ann. $
78-27-33 (2002). The trial court properly admitted
the EMTs' report and correctly concluded that 1 tab
(ode section 7^-27-^3 was impliedly modified insofar as it is inconsistent with rule 803(4) of the
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I tah Rules of L\ idencc And, because the *448
EMTs' report contains Mrs Fox's admissions that
her pre existing medical condition was a factor in
her fall, the trial court correctly concluded that the
nature of her injury was sufficiently complex as to
require an expert to establish a prima facie case on
the element of causation We therefore affirm

BACKGROUND
1 2 On April 20, 2004, Mrs Fox entered BYU's
campus and went to the Harman Building to purchase a ticket for an upcoming conference As Mrs
Fox left the Harman Building, she descended the
west stairway and fell After falling, Mrs Fox was
unable to stand or use her right leg A passerby noticed Mrs Fox and sought help
% 3 In response to the request for help, EMTs ar
rived and examined Mrs Fox The EMTs were volunteers for the Emergency Medical Services team
at BYU BYU provides the van that the EMTs use
to respond to field calls, and the EMTs are based in
BYU's student center, the Wilkinson Center
K 4 When the EMTs arrived at the steps ot the Har
man Building, they found Mrs Fox in a seated position on the stairs They observed that Mrs Fox's
right knee was obviously swollen and that there
was deformity on both sides of her leg They also
noted that there was no external trauma to her leg
or knee, such as scrapes or scuff marks, and that
Mrs Fox's pants were not ripped or torn
T| 5 While the EMTs were assessing her condition
and treating her, Mrs Fox repeatedly stated to them
that she felt her right knee go out as she was going
down She explained to the EMTs that she fell
down only one stair, that she had been previously
diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her right knee and
that there was some missing cartilage in that knee
Mrs Fox also stated that she did not hold BYU responsible but that she had always felt that the stairs
bv the Harman Building were too narrow and have
always been dangerous
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^ 6 Mrs Fox's statements, the EMTs' medical observations, and the treatment given at the scene of
the fall were transcribed in a report, which Mrs
Fox signed, and were also recounted in an affidavit
submitted by one of the responding EMTs The
EMTs applied a vacuum splint to Mrs Fox's leg
and transported her to the Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center Emergency Room She was admitted to the medical center and informed that she had
a broken right leg She then underwent surgery,
during which a fixator was attached to her leg
D 7 Several days after Mrs Fox's fall, Mr Fox went
to the Harman Building and examined the stairs He
noted that there was some cracking in the stairs' cement and that some ot the metal nosings on the
stairs were loose He took pictures of the cement
and nosings, as well as the general area where he
believed Mrs Fox had fallen No further examination of the stairs took place because they were replaced shortly thereafter, an improvement that had
been scheduled prior to Mrs Fox's fall
*} 8 The Foxes subsequently brought suit against
BYU for negligence and loss ot consortium, asserting that BYU had negligently maintained the stairs
outside the Harman Building and that the defective
stairs had caused Mrs Fox to slip, fall, and break
her leg Prior to the scheduled bench trial, BYU
brought a motion in limine asserting, among other
things, that the negligence claim failed because the
Foxes did not have expert testimony to establish
their prima facie case Specifically, BYU contended
that the only facts relating to the element of causation within Mrs Fox's ordinary senses, as a lay witness, were that she was descending the stairs and
tell BYU urged that, by her admissions to the
EMTs, Mrs Fox had introduced a medically complex pre existing condition osteoirthntis, as a potential tactor in her fall BYU therefore argued that
the biomechanics involved in her tall, the medical
cause of her injuries, and the need for the treatment
she received were not within the ordinary senses of
an^ layperson
^ 9 The Foxes conceded that they would not be
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presenting expert testimony at the bench trial.
However, they asserted that lay testimony was sufficient to establish their prima facie case because
the injury and damages Mrs. Fox experienced were
within the realm of common experience and because *449 there was no significant lapse of time
between the injury and the onset of the physical
condition for which Mrs. Fox sought compensation.
The Foxes also objected to the admissibility of the
EMTs' report and the affidavit, arguing that Utah
Code section 78-27-33 prohibits the admission of
statements made by an injured person that were obtained by agents of her adversary, unless certain
procedures are followed. The Foxes asserted that
these procedures were not followed and BYU conceded as much at the pre-trial hearing.

with prejudice.

Tl 10 The trial court agreed with BYU's position
and, recognizing the dispositive nature of the issues
presented in the motion in limine, converted the
motion to one for dismissal pursuant to rule 41(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial
court concluded that the EMTs' report and the affidavit were admissible under rule 803(4) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence because they contained statements made by Mrs. Fox for purposes of medical
diagnosis and treatment. The trial court held that, to
the extent that Utah Code section 78-27-33 is inconsistent with rule 803(4), the statute was impliedly repealed by virtue of the Utah Constitution.

H 13 Further, the Foxes argue that the trial court
erred by admitting the EMTs' report and the affidavit containing Mrs. Fox's out-of-court statements
because the statements were procured by agents of
the Foxes' adversary, BYU.'The standard of review
when considering the admissibility of out-of-court
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence depends on 'whether the trial court's analysis involves
a factual or legal determination or some combination thereof.1 " State v. Parker. 2000 UT 51, * 13.
4 P.3d 778 (quoting Hansen v. Heath, S52 P.2d
977, 978 (Utah 1993)). "Whether a statement was
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment is a mixed question of law and fact."
Hansen. 852 P.2d at 978. Thus, where the trial
court's analysis "involves a factual determination
that the statement was indeed made to aid medical
diagnosis,11 id. at 978-79, this court will "apply a
clearly erroneous standard of review to those
[factual] findings,11 Parker, 2000 UT 51, 1 13, 4
P.3d 778. But where the court's analysis involves a
legal determination, such determination will be reviewed "for correctness.11 Hansen. #52 P.2d at 979.

1 11 The trial court also ruled that the Foxes could
not sustain their burden of proof as to causation and
damages because Mrs. Fox's lay witness testimony
was insufficient to establish their prima facie case.
In making this ruling, the court noted that it had
been presented with two plausible theories of causation-failure of an osteoarthritic knee or defective
stairs-and, absent expert testimony, the court would
have to use speculation to choose between the two
theories. The trial court also ruled that Mr. Fox's
loss of consortium claim failed because it was dependent on the viability and success of Mrs. Fox's
negligence claim. Given the failure of both causes
of action, the trial court dismissed the Foxes' suit

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
^j 12 The Foxes claim that the trial court erred by
determining that Utah Code section 78-27-33 was
partially repealed by the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. " 'A constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness.... When addressing such a challenge,
this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality/ " State v. Morrison. 200! UT 73, ^ 5,
31 P.3d 547 (omission in original) (quoting State v.
Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 6, QS0 P.2d 191).

K 14 Finally, the Foxes claim that the trial court
erred in dismissing their suit against BYU for failure to present expert testimony to establish a prima
facie case on the element of causation. "As with a

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

!76P.3d446
176 P.3d 446, 229 Ed. Law Rep. 256, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 406
(Cite as: 176P.3d446)

directed verdict, whether dismissal was appropriate
for failure to make a prima facie case is a question
of law reviewed for correctness."
Grosser! v.
DeWht, 1999 UT App lo7, <j 8, 982 P.2d 581. "An
appellate court will not reverse the findings of fact
of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are
... clearly erroneous." Orion v Carter, 970 P.2d
1254, 1256 (Utah W 8 ) (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,
"we review a trial court's legal *450 conclusions for
correctness, according the trial court no particular
deference." Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Admissibility of the EMTs' Report
^| 15 The Foxes claim that the EMTs' report and the
affidavit were inadmissible because they included
out-of-court statements that were obtained in violation of Utah Code section 78-27-33 and that the
statute has not been impliedly repealed, even partially, by the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of rule
803(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Utah
Constitution grants the supreme court the power to
''adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of the state." Utah Con>t. art. \ III. §
4. In 1985, the supreme court used its constitutional
power to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
In Re: Rules of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of this state, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(Utah 1985). At the same time, the supreme court
adopted only those previously existing statutory
rules of procedure and evidence that were "not inconsistent with or superseded by [the new] rules of
procedure and evidence." Id. In doing so, the supreme court made clear that "[a]ny existing statutes
inconsistent with these rules ... will be impliedly repealed." Utah R. Evid. Preliminary Note; see, e.g..
State v Fulton, 742 P 2d 120X, 1217 (f/ ta h 1987)
(noting that the adoption of rule 601 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence impliedly repealed section
78-24-2(2) and its presumption of incompetency for
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children under ten years of age). In order for the legislature to "'amend the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court," it may
only do so "upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses." Utah Const, art. VIIL § 4.
^| 16Utah Code section 78-27-33 existed at the time
the supreme court adopted the new set of rules of
evidence. Pursuant to this statute, a statement
"obtained from an injured person within 15 days of
an occurrence ... by a person whose interest is adverse" is not admissible evidence unless the adverse
person leaves a "written verbatim copy of the statement ... with the injured party at the time the statement was taken," and the injured party does not disavow the statement "in writing" within a specified
time. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-33 (2002). This statute was enacted in \913. See Act of February 23,
1973, ch. 208, § 2, 1973 Utah Laws 709. P N l
FN 1. Although the statute was amended in
1998, after the supreme court's adoption of
the rules of evidence, the amendment was
minor and does not signal the legislature's
attempt to amend the rules of evidence adopted by the supreme court. The statute, as
originally written, allowed statements procured by a "law enforcement officer" to be
admitted, regardless of whether the law enforcement officer was adverse or may become adverse to the injured party. In 1998,
the legislature merely substituted the
phrase "peace officer" for "iaw enforcement officer." See Act of March 4, 1998,
ch. 282, § 82, 1998 Utah Laws 1019.
Moreover, the house bill that brought
about the amendment was aimed at modifying trie Utah Code with respect to peace
officers. See Act of March 4, 1998, ch.
282, 1998 Utah Laws 978 (describing the
act as "relating to public safety; modifying
and clarifying the various classifications of
peace officers and the requisite training
and
certification;
making
technical
changes; and providing a coordination
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clause"). The bill cannot be construed, as
the Foxes assert, as intended to address inconsistencies between Utah Code section
78-27-33 and the Utah Rules of Evidence.
11 17 Since 1985, however, rule 803(4) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence permitted the admission of
"[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,'1 as well as statements
"describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source
thereof,11 despite the fact that such statements may
be hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 803(4). The only other
qualification is that the statements must be
"'reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.11
Id."l£ the statement meets both qualifications, it is
admissible because of the 'patient's strong motivation to be truthful' when discussing his or her medical condition with a doctor.11 Hansen v. Heath, 852
P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993) (quoting Fed.R.Evid.
803(4) advisory committee's note).
FN2. Statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis and treatment "need not
have been made to a physician. Statements
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers,
or even members of the family might be
included.11 Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) advisory
committee's note.
*451 [1] 1i 18 Therefore, there exists an inconsistency as to the admissibility of evidence in the limited circumstance where the injured party's adversary retains bona fide medical personnel who
obtain statements from the injured party for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Rule
803(4) of the Utah Rules o\ Evidence permits the
admission of all statements made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis and treatment, such as Mrs. Fox's
statements to the BYU EMTs, regardless of whether the medical personnel to whom the statements
were made are adverse to the injured party or
simply neutral. Without the requisite notice,
however, Utah Code section 78-27-33 would not
permit the admission of statements made for the
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purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment when
the statements are made to medical personnel who
also serve as agents of the injured party's adversary.
K 19 The facts of the instant case highlight the inconsistency between rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence and Utah Code section 78-27-33. Here,
the trial court correctly concluded that the EMTs
responding to Mrs. Fox's fall, while volunteers,
were nonetheless agents of BYU because they
worked under BYU's name, used equipment supplied by BYU, and operated from BYU's buildings.
See Nelson v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
935 P.2d 512. 512 (Utah 1997) (acknowledging that
a person may be a "volunteer agent11 of a principal);
see a/so Restatement (Third) Agency § 1.01 (2006)
("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises
when one person (a 'principal1) manifests assent to
another person (an 'agent1) that the agent shall act
on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.11). BYU is, undoubtedly,
Mrs. Fox's adversary in the present suit. Furthermore, the court committed no clear error by finding
that Mrs. Fox's statements to the EMTs were in fact
made for the purpose of receiving a medical diagnosis of her condition and treatment of her injury.
^[ 20 Given this inconsistency, we conclude that
rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence partially
repealed, or in other words, limited the applicability
of Utah Code section 78-27-33. We emphasize,
however, that Utah Code section 78-27-33 is invalid only to the extent that it is inconsistent with rule
803(4), i.e., in the very narrow circumstance where
an adversary retains bona fide medical personnel
who obtain statements from injured persons for the
limited and exclusive purpose of medical diagnosis
and treatment. In circumstances where statements
obtained by a potentially adverse party are not for
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, there
is no inconsistency between the rule of evidence
and Utah Code section 7S-27-33, and the statute remains viable.
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II. Dismissal for Lack of Expert Testimony
[2][3][4] f 21 The Foxes contend that expert testimony was not required to establish a prima facie
case regarding the cause of Mrs. Fox's injuries because her fall, broken leg, and subsequent medical
treatment were temporally connected and within the
common knowledge and experience of a layperson.
Plaintiffs carry the "'burden [of] establishing] a
prima facie case of negligence," Clark v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct.App.1995),
including "proximate and actual causation of the injury,11 id. at 600; see also Jackson v. Colston, 1 16
Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (1949) ("It is fundamental that the burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the causal connection between the injury
and the alleged negligence of the defendant.11).
"[T]he causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the injury is never presumed and ...
this is a matter the plaintiff is always required to
prove affirmatively.11 Jackson, 209 P.2d at 568.
Although "the question of proximate causation is
generally reserved for the jury,11 Clark, 893 P.2d at
601 (internal quotation marks omitted), "the trial
court may rule as a matter of law on this issue ... if
../there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation,1
id.(quoting Steffcnsen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.,
820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct.App.l99l)).
[5] U 22 In Utah, "[t]he need for positive expert
testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act and *452 the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of the injury." Beard v.
K-Mart Corp.. 2000 UT App 285, % 16, 12 P.3d
1015 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
"[w]here the injury involves obscure medical
factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's
knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding, there must be expert testimony that the
negligent act probably caused the injury.11
Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In
such cases, the "testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need for specific medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury.11 hi It is
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only in "the most obvious cases11 that a plaintiff
may be excepted from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation, hi
[6] f 23 Mrs. Fox's slip-and-fall negligence suit is
not a case that is excepted from the requirement
that a plaintiff use expert testimony to establish a
causal link between the defendant's negligent act
and her injury. At the scene of Mrs. Fox's fall, she
first attributed the cause of her fall to the fact that
her knee "gave out.11 She admitted to the EMTs
that she had been diagnosed with a pre-existing
condition, osteoarthritis, in that same knee. Thus,
by her own initial explanation of the cause of her
fall and her admission of an osteoarthritic condition, Mrs. Fox tied the cause of her fall to medical
factors sufficiently complicated to be beyond the
ordinary senses and common experience of a
layperson. Mrs. Fox's lay testimony would not have
been sufficient to determine whether the need for
her medical treatment, the surgery and attachment
of the fixator, was caused by BYU's allegedly defective stairs or the failure of her own arthritic
knee. Although Mrs. Fox could testify that she descended the stairway, fell, and experienced pain, she
needed expert testimony to establish her prima facie
case of causation and to prevent the fact-finder
from resorting to speculation. Absent this expert
testimony, the trial court correctly ruled that Mrs.
Fox had failed to prove the element of causation
and her negligence claim failed as a matter of
.
FN3
law.
FN3. We note that, in this case, it was the
plaintiff herself who presented the two theories of causation. By highlighting these
dueling theories and emphasizing that under one theory BYU's alleged negligence
was not the cause of Mrs. Fox's fall, BYU
was not presenting an affirmative defense,
such as an intervening cause, for which it
would have carried the burden of proof.
Compare Nixdorf r. Hicken, 612 P.2d
348, 353 a. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that
an "intervening cause may be used as a de-
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fense against the plaintiffs proof of proximate causation"), with State v. Malaga,
2006 UT App 103, f 22, 132 P.3d 703
(distinguishing between a defense that contemplates an intervening force as the cause
of the injury and a defense that presents an
alternative version of events "which does
not implicate intervening causes at all");
see also Scale v. Cowans. 923 P.2d 1361,
1363 {Utah 1996) (stating that defendants
have the burden of proof with respect to
affirmative defenses). Rather, BYU was
refuting the Foxes' preferred theory and reminding the court that "the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show that the injury
was negligently caused by [the] defendant,
[and that] it is not enough to show the injury ... might have occurred from negligence and many other causes.11 Baxter v.
Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 265 (1931)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
"[w]hen a plaintiff produces evidence that
is consistent with an hypothesis that the
defendant is not negligent, and also with
one that he is, [the plaintiffs] proof tends
to establish neither.11 Id, (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Utah Rules of Evidence. Although Utah Code
section 78-27-33 may have barred such reports, that
statute is inconsistent with rule 803(4) and impliedly modified to the extent of the inconsistency.
The trial court did not err in dismissing the Foxes'
negligence claim for failure to present expert testimony on the *453 element of causation because the
factors associated with Mrs. Fox's fall and injury
were sufficiently medically complex to require such
testimony. Because the loss of consortium claim
was dependent on the viability of the negligence
claim, the trial court properly dismissed it as well.
H 26 We affirm.
% 27 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
Utah App.,2007.
Fox v. Brigham Young University
176 P.3d 446, 229 Ed. Law Rep. 256, 594 Utah
Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 406
END OF DOCUMENT

% 24 The trial court also correctly ruled that Mr.
Fox's claim for loss of consortium failed because it
was dependent on the success of Mrs. Fox's negligence claim. Under Utah statute, a "spouse's action
for loss of consortium ... [is] derivative from the
cause of action in behalf of the injured personf,]
and ... it may not exist in cases where the injured
person would not have a cause of action.11 Utah
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(5)(a), (b) (2007). Mr. Fox's
loss of consortium claim ceased to exist when Mrs.
Fox's negligence claim failed.

CONCLUSION
% 25 The trial court did not err in admitting the
EMTs' report and the affidavit because they contained admissible hearsay pursuant to rule 803H) of
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Darlene BEARD, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
K-MART CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20000095-CA.
Oct. 19, 2000.
Customer sued store for negligence after being accidentally struck by elbow of employee. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone Medley, J., denied store's motion for partial directed
verdict on damages issue and entered judgment
upon jury verdict for customer. Store appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, held that: (1) expert
testimony was required to establish that store's negligence caused the need for customer to undergo
three surgeries subsequently performed on her neck
and wrists; and (2) surgeon's testimony was insufficient to show store's negligence caused conditions
requiring surgery.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
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Expert testimony was required, in negligence action
by customer who was accidentally struck by elbow
of store employee, to establish that store's negligence caused the need for customer to undergo
three complex neurological surgeries subsequently
performed on her neck and wrists.
[51 Evidence 157 € ^ 5 7 1 ( 9 )
1 57 Evidence
157X11 Opinion Evidence
157X1K F) Effect of Opinion Evidence
157k569 Testimony of Experts
157k571 Nature of Subject
I57k571(9) k. Cause and Effect.
Most Cited Cases
Customer who was accidentally struck by elbow of
store employee failed to present sufficient expert
testimony that store's negligence caused the need
for surgeries subsequently performed on her neck to
alleviate pain from bone spurs and on her wrists for
carpal tunnel syndrome, where surgeon testified to
a chronological association between accident and
onset of symptoms but did not testify to reasonable
degree of medical certainty that accident caused the
conditions addressed by the surgeries.
*1016 M. David Eckersley,Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
William R. Rawiings, Draper, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.

OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
T| I Defendant/appellant K-Mart Corporation
(K-Mart) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a partial directed verdict. We reverse and
remand for a new trial.
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when a K-Mart employee struck her in the head
with his elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. As she fell toward the floor, she felt a
severe headache, as well as pain in her wrists, knee,
and ankle. She visited her doctor the following day,
complaining of head, neck, knee, and foot pain, and
continued to have severe headaches, a sore neck,
aching hands, and leg and foot pain. Beard saw a
number of doctors and ultimately underwent a number of surgeries. Beard sued K-Mart for its employee's negligence in striking her. Three surgeries, performed on her neck and wrists by Dr. Robert
Peterson, are at issue in this appeal. K-Mart asserts
these surgeries are not causally connected to the accident at its store.
H 3 At trial, Beard testified that her neck and wrist
problems began when she was struck in the head at
K-Mart. In addition, her family physician and her
surgeon Dr. Peterson testified "there was a chronologic association for the time of the incident [at KMart] to the time of the onset of symptoms."
However, Dr. Peterson testified that he could not
say to a degree of reasonable medical probability
that the accident at K-Mart caused the need for
either her neck or wrist surgeries.
U 4 At the close of Beard's case, K-Mart moved for
a partial directed verdict, arguing Beard had not
presented sufficient evidence * 1017 to permit the
jury to find that her need for the neck and wrist surgeries was the proximate result of the injuries she
FN 1
had suffered at K-Mart.
The trial court denied
K-Mart's motion, and the jury awarded Beard
$431,290.22 in damages.
FN1. Both parties characterize K-Mart's
motion as one for a directed verdict;
however, the motion was effectively one
requesting a jury instruction excluding
consideration of the evidence regarding the
neck and wrist surgeries.

FACTS
Tj 2 On September 15, 1996, plaintiff/appellee Darlene Beard (Beard) was injured in a K-Mart store

STANDARD OF REVIEW
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T| 5"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's
denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review 4
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain
the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with
the ground asserted for directing a verdict." ' "
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, % 16, 990 P.2d
933 (quoting White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297. 1300
(Utah 1983) (quoting Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1 165 (Utah 1983})). If we conclude Beard did raise a material fact precluding
judgment against her as a matter of law, we must
affirm the trial court's denial of K-Mart's motion
and uphold the jury's verdict. See id.

ANALYSIS
f 6 K-Mart argues Beard failed to present expert
medical testimony establishing that her need for
neck and wrist surgeries was caused by K-Mart's
negligence. The essence of K-Mart's argument is
that Beard's own testimony and the general testimony of her doctors that she did not suffer neck
and wrist complaints before the injury at K-Mart is
insufficient as a matter of law to allow the jury to
consider whether these surgeries were a result of KMart's negligence. K-Mart argues that only expert
medical testimony that the need for her surgeries
was proximately caused by K-Mart's negligence
will suffice. Thus, K-Mart argues the trial court
erred in not directing a verdict in its favor and removing this evidence from the jury's consideration.
^| 7 K-Mart relies on Denney v. St. Mark's Hospital,
21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 < 1968), for the proposition that "if the expert evidence offered on the
issue of medical causation is simply that a particular injury could have resulted from a particular accident, but not that it probably did, such testimony
is insufficient for submission of the issue to the
jury/ 1 In Denney, the plaintiff had undergone neck
surgery and was having K-rays taken of her lumbar
spine for unrelated treatment when a medical technician forcefully pushed her neck close to her

knees, allegedly causing a feeling like an electric
shock in the back of her neck. See Denney, 442
P.2d at 944-45. Two days later, she suffered a
stroke. See id. More than four months later, the
plaintiff told her neurologist that her neck had been
forced forward during the spinal x-rays. See id.
The following year, a spinal fusion was performed
and a neck nerve severed to relieve pain. See id.
The plaintiff alleged the x-ray technician's negligence was responsible for her ailments. See id. At
trial, she testified as to the feeling in her neck when
the technician pushed on it, and to continuing pain,
numbness, and loss of vision after the incident. See
id. Additionally, her neurologist testified that the
force used by the technician could cause disc problems, but on cross-examination admitted it was a
"medical probability" that her ailments were the
result of the stroke. Id.
% 8 The Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of the hospital. See
id. at 946. The court stated:
in those cases which depend upon knowledge
of the scientific effect of medicine, the results
of surgery, or whether the attending physician
exercised the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the community
which he serves, must ordinarily be established
by the testimony of physicians and surgeons.

The only facts in the instant case which may be
ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of a
lay witness are that the technician moved
plaintiffs body, and that the back of her head
hurt. No lay witness *1018 can by the ordinary
use of his senses say that the complaints of the
plaintiff, including the hurting in the back of her
head, was caused by this claimed adjustment of
her position on the x-ray table.
Id. (quoting Fredrick wn v. Maw, 119 Utah 385,
3*7. 227 P.2d 772. " 7 4 (1951)). The court concluded that the plaintiffs evidence did not show
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that her injuries were the result of the negligence of
the technician. See id. at 947.
% 9 K-Mart also relies on Moore v, Denver <£ Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company. 4 Utah 2d 255,
292 P.2d 849 (1956). In Moore, the plaintiffs doctor testified that "it was possible" that plaintiffs accident had caused a ruptured lumbar disc and nerve
pressure. Id. at 850. The doctor estimated a five
percent permanent disability "based in part on the
predictability of exacerbation and remission of
pain" over time. Id. The defendant moved to strike
the doctor's testimony, arguing that "possibilities"
were not probative, but the trial court denied the
motion. Id. An instruction taking consideration of a
ruptured disc from the jury on the basis that no
competent evidence had been given on the matter
was likewise refused by the trial court. See id.
\ 10 On appeal, the defendant argued that the doctor's testimony was "insufficient to provide a question of the existence of an injured disc." Id. The
Utah Supreme Court recognized that the doctor's
testimony regarding the permanency of the
plaintiffs disability was "linked to the possibility of
a disc injury" and was a significant part of the
plaintiffs case. Id. The court stated: "Under these
circumstances, if the proof of such an injury falls
short of that required under our law, then an instruction to that effect should have been given the
jury." Id. at 850-51. The court noted that under
long-standing Utah law, a "plaintiff retains the burden of proving his damages by competent evidence
to an extent where the trier of fact could discover
that which is probably true." Id. at 851 (emphasis
added). The court agreed with the plaintiff that
there was evidence of some injury, but stated:
the jury was allowed to speculate upon the existence of a disc injury, which may be determinative
of the important element of permanency of the injury when no affirmative evidence was offered on
this issue. Although the medical testimony indicated that the symptoms showed a nerve irritation,
and that such symptoms were consistent with the
existence of a disc injury, we cannot discover in
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the witness' words anything more than their corollary that, under the circumstances a disc injury
was not impossible.
Id. at 259, 292 P.2d at 851. Because there was a
strong likelihood the jury considered the permanency of the injury to have been proven by expert
testimony, the court reversed the jury's verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, holding that a limiting instruction should have been given. See id.
% 11 In the instant case, K-Mart argues that although Beard testified her neck and wrist problems
began at the time of her injury at K-Mart, her belief
that her neck and wrist surgeries were, therefore,
the result of that incident cannot overcome the failure of the medical evidence to substantiate that belief
T| 12 In contrast. Beard argues she was not required
to put on expert medical evidence. Beard claims
that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are
generally only required in medical malpractice
cases. We disagree.
T| 13 Beard presents cases from other jurisdictions
holding that expert medical testimony is not required to submit to the jury questions about the
need for medical treatment and expenses. See, e.g.,
Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga.App. 74, 380 S.E.2d 714,
715 (f Q 89); Polacn v. Smith, 376 So.2d 409,
409-10 (Fla.Ct.App.1979); Walton v. Gcillbraith.
15 Mich.App. 490, 166 N.W.2d 605, 606 (1969).
However, we conclude these cases are factually distinguishable as they involve medical damages within the common experience of a layperson.
% 14 In Smoot, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
injuries she sustained in an automobile collision.
See 380 S.E.2d at 714. Her case consisted of ""her
testimony and that of the responding police officer,
pictures of her damaged car, and her medical bill."
Id. The *1019 plaintiff testified that she visited a
chiropractor the day of the accident and following
the accident and that the chiropractic treatments
had given her relief. See id. The trial court direc-
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ted a verdict for the defendant "on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie personal
injury case because she had not introduced expert
medical testimony" connecting the collision and her
injuries. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, stating "where, as here, there is no significant lapse of time between the injury sustained and
the onset of the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors must be credited
with knowing by reason of common knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required.11
Id.
(emphasis added).
K 15 Beard also relies on Walton v. Gallhraith, 15
Mich.App. 490, 166 N.W.2d 605 (1969). In Walton,
the plaintiff sued the defendant for neck, back, and
shoulder injuries caused by a car accident. See id.
at 605. At trial, no physician testified for the
plaintiff, and the defendant "objected to the admission into evidence of bills for medicine and treatment on the ground that there was no showing that
they were causally connected with the ... accident.11
Id. The defendant also requested an instruction to
exclude the jury's consideration of the bills. See
id. The trial court denied both motions, and the
jury awarded the plaintiff $3500 in damages. See
id. On appeal, the defendant argued it was error to
introduce plaintiffs medical bills. See id. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, argued "that a causal
connection between the accident and the injury may
be shown without expert testimony.11 Id. at 605-06.
The court stated:
A brief review of the function of the jury leads us
to the conclusion that plaintiffs position is the
correct one. Her testimony emphasizes the facts
that there were no previous neck or back pains
and that they began the day after the accident.
In a situation such as this, it should be clear to
men of common experience that the cause of the
injuries was the accident and no expert was
needed to demonstrate this fact.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court
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sustained the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
See id.
[1][2][3][4] K 16 In this case, the question is not
whether the accident at K-Mart caused Beard injury, but rather whether injuries sustained as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the neurological surgeries performed on Beard's neck and
wrists. Beard was properly permitted to testify that
the accident in the store caused pain and injury. The
question as to whether such pain and injury resulted
from the blow is within the common knowledge
and experience of lay witnesses and could properly
be submitted to the jury. What is missing in the
evidence, however, is the link between the injuries
suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah,
in all but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay
witnesses regarding the need for specific medical
treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the
jury. See generally Denney v. St. Mark's Flosp.. 2i
Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968); Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292
P.2d 849 (1956); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v.
Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929 (1922). Certainly
whether the need for complex neurological surgery
was a result of the accident at K-Mart is not within
the common experience of laypersons. As stated in
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 44 Wash. A pp.
244,722 P.2d 819, 824(1986):
The need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends upon
the nature of the injury. Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond
an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating
speculation in making a finding, there must be
expert testimony that the negligent act probably
caused the injury.
Id. at 824. "The diagnosis and potential continuance
of a disease are medical questions to be established
by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay
persons.11 Eherhart v. Morns Brown College, 181
Ga.App. 516, 352 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1987). Thus, we
conclude expert testimony on this medical causa-
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tion issue was required before the issue *1020 of
damages arising from these surgeries was submitted
to the jury.

which has receded, abnormal movement, local irritation.
Q: Is that also the aging process as well?

[5] % 17 Plaintiff alternatively contends that even if
she was required to put on expert medical testimony that her need for neck and wrist surgeries was
caused by the accident at K-Mart, she introduced
adequate expert medical testimony.
% 18 Dr. Peterson, the surgeon who performed
Beard's neck surgery and both wrist surgeries, testified extensively regarding the causes of Beard's
neck pain, wrist pain, and his surgical treatment of
them:
A: [T]he question is, you know, what the cause
is. The answer is, basically, I have no way of
proving anything. But the association is that
Mrs. Beard came to me and-and, more or less,
was a person who was doing well prior to this incident at K-Mart and since that time has been suffering a rather significant problem which could
be-you know, which was associated with some
significant anatomic compromise in her neck.
And from my standpoint, there was a chronologic
association from the time of the incident to the
time of the onset of the symptoms.
Q: [by Beard's counsel]: What do you mean by
chronological association?

A: Being on a planet with gravity.

Q: [by K-Mart's counsel]: You performed neck
surgery on Darlene Beard because she had marginal osteophytes in her neck, bone spurs.
A: That's essentially correct.
Q: Those were pre-existing to September 15,
1996.
A: That would be my best guess.
Q: In fact, you termed, in your deposition, that as
a severe form of degenerative disk disease; is that
correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: All of that was pre-existing long before this KMart incident ever happened?
A: No argument.
Q: Do you know how long?
A: Have no idea.

A: Happened at the same time.... [T]o my knowledge, [Beard] did not have these complaints prior to being hit at K-Mart.

Q: Can you interpret for us what you found on
the MRl?
A: Bone spur.
Q: What causes bone spurs?
A: Well, sort of the same thing that causes a
bunion, irritation, disk-an old disk herniation

Q: Do you know how they got there?
A: As mentioned previously in testimony, it is essentially concomitant with being on a planet with
gravity long enough. But it has to do with local
irritation and other potential compromises such
as trauma.
Q: You don't know whether it was trauma, whether it was heredity, whether it was wear and tear,
whether it was gravity-as to how those bone
spurs got there.
A: Absolutely no idea.
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Q: And you're not saying to the jury, to a degree
of reasonable medical probability, that this incident at K-Mart caused such a condition in her
neck; isn't that correct?
A: No, I'm not telling the jury that at all.
Q: You just don't know, do you?
A: No.
H 19 When questioned about the wrist surgery, Dr.
Peterson testified:
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that any
other incident, other than the accident of
9-15-96, may have caused this condition?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Could trauma cause that?
A: Trauma-trauma can cause carpal funnel syndrome. At least certainly aggravate pre-existing
condition.

between the accident and her symptoms. No expert
medical testimony was received that the neck and
wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident.
Thus, it was error for the trial judge not to grant a
directed verdict removing these issues from the
jury. Therefore we must reverse and remand for a
new trial.
FN2. Counsel for K-Mart conceded and we
conclude that Beard will have an opportunity on remand to offer competent expert
medical testimony on the issue of whether
the accident at K-Mart either caused the
need for her neck and wrist surgeries or
exacerbated a pre-existing condition which
necessitated the surgeries.
t 21 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge,
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Judge.
Utah App.,2000.
Beard v. K-Mart Corp.
12 P.3d 1015, 406 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2000 UT App
285
END OF DOCUMENT

Q: Okay. And so, you're not telling the jury,
again, to any degree of reasonable probability
that her carpal tunnel was caused by this incident
at K-Mart; isn't that correct?
A: That's correct.
*102l K 20 We simply cannot say from the record
before us that the expert medical testimony was
sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether
Beard's surgeries were necessitated by K-Mart's
negligence and if so what damaee she suffered as a
result of those surgeries. "* Without the required
expert medical opinion linking the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury would simply be speculating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge
and experience. The expert medical testimony
merely established a chronological relationship
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f>
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-3
West's Utah Code Annotated ( uirentness
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration (Rets <k \nnos)
*ii Chapter 4 Court of Appeals
_• § 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary

(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over

(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
(I) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 61G-1-602,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony,
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a con\ iction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony,
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases invoking a first degree or capital felony

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

U.C.A. 1953 §78A-4-l03

Page 2

(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the
Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c 3. 5 350, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008. c. 382, § 2210, eff May 5. 2008.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1476, provides:
"Section 1476. Coordinating H.B. 78 with H.B. 63—Superseding amendments.
"If this H.B. 78 and H.B. 63, Recodification of Title 63 State Affairs in General, both pass, it is the intent of the
Legislature that the amendments in this H.B. 78 supersede the amendments to the same sections in H.B. 63, except that the section renumbering and internal cross references to Title 63 in H.B. 63 supersede and shall replace
the section numbering and references to Title 63 in H.B. 78 when the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel prepares the Utah Code database for publication/ 1
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350 and
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210.

Prior Laws:
Laws 1986, c. 47, §46.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304.
Laws 1988, c 73, § I.
Laws 1988, c. 210, § 141.
Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8.
Laws 1990, c 80, § 5.
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Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3 .
Laws 1991, c. 268, §22.
Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12.
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 45.
Laws 1995, c. 299, §47.
Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19.
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49.
Laws 2001, c. 255, §20.
Laws 2001, c. 302, § 2 .
C. 1953, § 78-2a-3.
CROSS REFERENCES
Military court, see §§ 39-6-15 and 39-6-16.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law and Procedure C^> 651 to 686, 721 to 726.
Courts €^> 207, 248, 483 to 488.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k207; 106k248; 15Ak651 to 15Ak686; l5Ak721 to 15Ak726; 106k483
to 106k488.
C.J.S. Courts §§ 193 to 202.
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 172 to 201, 204, 208 to 212, 218 to 219, 259 to 271.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Appellate jurisdiction,
Adoption, jurisdiction of Supreme Court, review of state court's interpretation of state law, due process,
see O'Connell v. Kirehner, U.S.UL1995, 115 S.Ct. 891. 513 U.S. 1303. 130 L.Ed.2d 873.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
Administrative entity determinations 5
Appeals from courts not of record 3
Attorney fees 8
Criminal convictions 6
Extradition orders 7
Final judgments and orders 4
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Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 9
Mandamus 10
Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 2
1. In general
District court did not have appellate jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to circuit court orders binding defendants over for trial, in absence of any statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legislature vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in Court of Appeals. L'.C.A.I 953, 63-46b-15,
77-35-7, 78-2a~3(2)(d), 78-3-4(5). State v. Humphrey. 1(>90, "94 P.2d 496, certiorari granted 804 ?2d 1232, reversed 823 P.2d 464. Criminal Law €^=> 1018
Failure of defendant to file direct appeal before seeking postconviction relief was not a jurisdictional defect
which would prevent the Court of Appeals from reviewing the district court's decision denying habeas corpus.
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(f). Gomm v. Cook, 19X8. 754 P.2d 1226. Habeas Corpus €==> 813
2. Original appellate jurisdiction, generally
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over a district court's review of a city council's decisions on
zoning issues. U.C.A.1953. 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v Pa>son City Corp., 2001, 17 P 3d 1160.
412 Ctah Adv. Rep. 26. 413 Utah Adv Rep. 13, 2001 LT App (), certiorari granted 26 P.3d 235, vacated 70 P.3d
47. 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 I T 16. Zoning And Planning € = > "41
3. Appeals from courts not of record
Magistrate was not "court of record," and thus Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal from magistrate's order binding defendant over for trial on re filed felony charge. Const. Art. 8, § 5;
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(d). State v. Fisk, 1998, 966 P 2d 860, 353 Utah Ad\ Rep. 34. Criminal Law €^>
1023(3)
4. Final judgments and orders
Employer's petition for review was filed prematurely with Court of Appeals, before Labor Commission's final
agency action denying employer's motion for reconsideration of award in favor of injured worker, despite fact
that employer filed within statutorily specified period after motion was "considered denied" by Commission's
inaction on motion, where Commission could and did change "considered denied" date to later date, and thus,
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider employer's appeal. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-!3(3)(b),
78-2a-3(2)(a). McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003. 65 P 3d 643. 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 2003 UT App 49.
Workers' Compensation € ^ > 1875
5. Administrative entity determinations
Labor Commission's interim order finding that workers' compensation claimant qualified for permanent total
disability was not final and appealable order, even though administrative rule stated that preliminary determination of permanent total disability, by Labor Commission or Appeals Board, was final agency action for purposes
of appellate judicial review, where statute, which controlled over administrative rule, provided that finding by
Commission of permanent total disability was not final, unless otherwise agreed by parties, until reemployment
plan was prepared and considered, and parties agreed this had not occurred. Target Trucking \ . Labor ConVn,
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2005, 108 P.3d 128. 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 L 2005 UT App 70. Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n © ^ 1833
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local government entities, since Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over orders over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction, and Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction to hear challenges to land use decisions by municipal governing bodies; there was no statutory provision that expressly
granted the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local governmental entities. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003, 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah
Adv. Rep. 12,2003 UT 16. Courts ©=> 206(17.1)
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider company's petition for review regarding conversion of
citation proceeding based on hiring of unlicensed electricians to perform electrical construction work from informal to formal adjudicative proceeding by Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing; conversion order was not final order. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l6, 78-2a-3(2)(a);
U.C.A.1953(1993 Ed.), 58-55-2(32)(C). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704; Licenses ©333 4 1
Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review orders that reserve something for further decision by
agency. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l6, 78-2a-3(2)(a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div.
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©=> 704
"Collateral order doctrine," which allows review of orders that conclusively determine disputed question, resolve important issue completely separate from merits of action, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal
from final judgment would not be applied to appeal from administrative action. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-16,
78-2a-3(2)(a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ challenging denial of motion to recuse
presiding officer of Division of Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR) based on fact that presiding
officer was also staff attorney. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l(3)(a), 78-2a-3(l)(b). V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1995, 893 P.2d 1093, certiorari granted 910 P.2d 425, reversed 939 P.2d 1 (92, 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 657.1; Environmental
Law ©33? 634

Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review decision by division of police officer standards and training
(POST) not to pursue decertification of wildlife conservation officer; since POST did not conduct any formal
proceedings, there was no final order resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, and citizen's filing of complaint with POST did not require it to conduct formal proceedings. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l et seq., 63-46b-16,
78-2a-3(2)(a). Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety,
1993. 85 i P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704; Game ©333> 6
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on whether the Tax Commission complied with remand order of the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding claim of Commission that its decision on remand was not a final appealable order because decision called for a further proceeding; appeal was an enforcement proceeding to determine if
Commission complied with remand order, and Supreme Court has jurisdiction by statute to issue all process necessary to carry into effect its orders; since case was transferred, Court of Appeals stood in shoes of Supreme
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Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2-2(2), 78-2a-3(l)(a), (2)(k). Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 1993,
848 P.2d 715, certiorari granted 860 P.2d 943, reversed 874 P.2d 840. Taxation €^=> 2693
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, pursuant to statute granting Court jurisdiction to review final agency
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, to review Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing's administrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss unprofessional conduct petitions filed against
person licensed to administer health facility, even though licensee had petitioned to have order reviewed by Division and such review was denied. U.C.A. 1953, l3-i~12(l)(a), 63-46b-16(l). Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992. 828 P.2d 542, certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516.
Health C=> 223(0
Court of Appeals would not defer ruling on jurisdictional issue until consideration of merits of appeal from administrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss professional conduct petitions filed against person licensed
to administer health facility, since Court's first duty was to determine whether it had jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953,
13-1-I2(l)(a), 63-46b~16(l). Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992, 828 P.2d 542, certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health € ^ > 223(1)
Statute giving the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of them defines the outermost limit of the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction and allows it to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right
of review. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P.2d 627. Administrative Law And Procedure C^> 663; Administrative Law And Procedure C^> 681.1
In the absence of specific statute creating right to judicial review of order of county board of appeals. Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764
P.2d 627. Administrative Law And Procedure C ^ ^ 663
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from district court order affirming administrative suspension of
license to operate a cosmetology/barbering school. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a-3; U.C.A. 1953, 58-1-36 (Repealed);
Const. Art. 8, § 5; Const. Art. 8, § 9 (Repealed); Court of Appeals Rule 4A. Scientific Academy of Hair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 1987, 738 P.2d 242. Administrative Law And Procedure ©=^> 681.1; Licenses €^> 38
6. Criminal convictions
State's ability to take appeal in criminal case is limited. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930
P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 I, rehearing denied. Criminal Law € ^ > 1024{ 1)
State could not take interlocutory appeal of magistrate's order denying its request to enhance defendant's driving
under the influence (DUI) charge to third-degree felony, as order did not fit within any of categories of appealable decisions. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309
Utah Adv. Rep, 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Lau C^> 1024(9)
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writ which challenge the
conviction of or sentence for first-degree felony or capital felony. U.C.A. 1953. 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(h). Neel
v. llolden, 1994, 886 P.2d 109"?. Habeas Corpus € = > 8 1 3
Because petitioner was not challenging his conviction or sentence, he should have appealed dismissal of his
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habeas corpus petition to Court of Appeals rather than Supreme Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Padilla v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 199 L 820 P.2d 473. Courts € ^ > 248
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of first degree or capital felony conviction and over petition
for extraordinary writ used as substitute for direct appeal of such conviction or sentence; Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction in all other cases. U.C.A. 1953. 78-2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814 P.2d 1148, certiorari
granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts € ^ > 248; Criminal Law € ^ > 1018; Criminal Law € ^ > 1019; Criminal Law
€^> 1020
Writ challenging postconviction actions of Board of Pardons was properly before Court of Appeals where it did
not challenge conviction in trial court or sentence; fact that defendant was serving sentence for first-degree
felony did not require transfer to Supreme Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814
P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €^> 248
When sentencing judge reduces conviction, appeal lies in court having jurisdiction of degree of crime recorded
in judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than degree of crime charged in information or found in verdict. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3-402, 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3(2)(f). State v. Doting, 1991, 813 P.2d
1 168. Criminal Law € ^ > 1019
Under statute granting Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs "involving a criminal conviction," Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of
appeal from denial of extraordinary writ involving an interstate transfer of a prisoner, which bore no relation to
the underlying criminal conviction except that, "but for" the conviction, he would not have been incarcerated in
Arizona and then transferred to Utah. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a~3, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Ellis v. DeLatid, 1989, 783 P.2d 559,
transferred to 786 P.2d 231. Habeas Corpus €^> 813
7. Extradition orders
Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over appeal by prisoner held for extradition to Idaho in Utah
county jail from district court's denial of prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to statute providing subject matter jurisdiction of appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving criminal
convictions; language of the statute is sufficiently broad to include those cases in which criminal conviction is
involved in habeas corpus proceeding to challenge extradition. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Hernandez v. Hayward, 1988, 764 P.2d 993. Habeas Corpus €=^> 813
8. Attorney fees
When party who prevails on appeal in divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at trial, claims attorney fees on
appeal solely on basis of new allegations of change in financial condition and those allegations are not a matter
of record and have not been adjudicated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals cannot evaluate claim; prevailing
party's claim for attorney fees on appeal based on allegation of need must be addressed by trial court to determine need of claiming spouse, ability of other spouse to pay, reasonableness of fees and amount, if any, to be
paid. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 1994, 875 P.2d 598. Divorce €^> 287
9. Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs
Supreme Court had jurisdiction, under statutory exception to Court of Appeals'jurisdiction over appeals from
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orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of Board of Pardons, to hear original direct appeal from district court's unconditional order of release on prisoner's petition challenging decision made at his
original parole grant hearing which fixed length of his prison stay for two first-degree felonies. U.C.A. 1953,
78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(g, h); Rules App.Proc, Rule 44. Preece v. House, 1994, M6 P.2d 508. Courts € ^ > 248
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ; by issuing writ sought by petition, court
would only be carrying into effect its judgments, orders and decree in previous cases directing judge to comply
with Rule 63(b) with respect to several of petitioner's cases. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(l)(a); Rules Civ.Proc. Rule
63(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €^> 207.1
Where Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over subject matter of divorce case in which petitioner who
filed petition for extraordinary writ had been a party, Court of Appeals had authority to issue necessary writs in
connection with that case, even if no appeal was pending. U.C.A, 1953, 78-2a-3(l)(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994,
882 P.2d 679. Courts € ^ > 207.1
10. Mandamus
Court's decision to grant or deny petition for extraordinary relief in nature of mandamus is discretionary with
court to which petition is brought, in sense that it is never matter of right on behalf of applicant. V-l. Oil Co. v.
Department of Enviroimiental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1997, 939 P.2d 1 192, 31.7 Utah Adv.
Rep. 11. Mandamus € ^ > 7
U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-4-103, UT ST § 78A-4-103
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM "D"
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment

NAN T.BASSETT-^8909
GARYT. WIGHT -;n0994
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P C
Attorneys for Pefendanl
10 Exchange Place. 4,,; Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84i 1 I
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

•ONAT HON HALL
Plan t IT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JliDGMENT

} ASONSTE1MLE
Case No. 040403916
Defendant.
Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by this Court on March 25, 2008
Defendant .U.son Stenrtic v as lep^eseiii'ixi bv Gary T Vughi. Plaintiff Jonathon Flail was
^presented bv Rex I Eagar.
Based upon the panics memoranda ar.u o;a! argument upon Defendant's Motion, this
Court holds that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice.
Specifically, this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows:

1

Plaintiff Jonathon Hall assents negligence claims against Defendant Jason Steimle

arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 11, 2000.
2.

in the summer of 1998 or 1999, Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury when he dove

lulu a siiuiiovv iakT.
3.

Plaintiff received chiropractic treatment for the whiplash injury,

4.

On October 4, 2000—just over two months before the December 2000 motor

vehicle accident

Plaintiff presented to Anderson Chiropractic, complaining of neck and back

pain.
5.

in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered permanent neck and back

injuries as a result of the Decembei 2000 motor vehicle accident.
6.

According to the Amended Stipulated Scheduling Order filed with this Court,

Plaintiffs expert reports were due on June 1, 2007
7.

Plaintiff never filed an ex pen: report ;n accordance with Rule 26 of the Utah Ruies

of Civil Procedure.
8.

Under Utah law. where the injur}' in question involves obscure medical factors

which are beyond an ordinary' lay person's knowledge, there must be expert testimony that the
negligent act probably caused the injury.
9.

In light of Plaintiff s injuries and treatment prior to the December 2000 motor

vehicle accident. Plaintiff was required to designate an expert on causation.

2

10.

Because Plaintiff designated no expert on causation, he cannot provide evidence

that the December 2000 motor vehicle accident caused the injuries described in his Complaint.
Accordingly, this Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES:
1.

Defendant's Morion for Sum«iia»v Jsdgi;i;ir is gran^d: ~:)£

2.

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.

3.

Each party shall bear us own attorney's fees and costs associated with this
motion.

DATED this , : ? 3 day of _

,2008..

*t

BY THE COURT

JAMES R. T
District Court Judge

.APPROVED AS TO FORM:
IVIE & YOUNG

,n

/

UlK-fJ.

JARED R. CASPER
REX I. EAGAR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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of the foregoing Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to the
following:
J3wi4-N. M o r t c f t s e f t - ^ ^
R. Phil Ivie
JaredR. Casper
Rex I. Fiagar
IVFf & YOUNG
<Vtom»*:v!v or Plaintiff
226 \K\<i 227") North. Sune 210
P.O. Box 657
Prove Utah 84603
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